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REAL PROPERTY
RALPH E. BOYER*
INTRODUCTION

The enactment of legislation limiting the duration of reverter and
forfeiture provisions in conveyances of real property to a period of twenty-one
years,1 the pasage of a new and more detailed mortgage foreclosure procedure,2
the enactment of a new curative act, and the amendment of dower, 4
mechanics' lien,5 statutory easement, * and eminent domain statutes7 highlighted legislative changes during the past two years. The determination of
the effect of homicide on the estate by the entireties, 8 the invalidation of the
1951 statute requiring a year's residence for eligibility for homestead real
property tax exemption, and a plethora of decisions involving such matters
as the Statute of Uses, 10 Rule in Shelley's Case,'" liquidated damage
provisions in contracts for the sale of real property, dower, delivery of
deeds, dedication, adverse possession, and many others, characterized judicial
developments.' 2 Quantitatively, of course, the judicial activity was the
more pronounced.
The material for this particular survey is divided into six main topics:
I. Vendor and Purchaser
II. Deeds.
I1. Estates, Dower, Homestead, and Future Interests
IV. Mortgages and Liens
V. Special Titles

VI. Rights in Land
Legislative changes are not discussed collectively as a separate topic but
are integrated into the case discussion of the particular subject matter.
Such legislative changes, however, where they occur, are indicated in the
subheadings, as, for example, Mortgages: Legislation. Hope is expressed
that the generous use of such headings and subheadings will provide au
easy access to the subject matter.
*Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. Member of the Ohio Bar.
1. FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1951).
2. Via. Laws 1953, c. 28093, amcndatorv of FL%. STTr. § 102.02 (1951).

3. Via. Laws 1953, c. 28208.
4. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28222, amendatory of FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1951).
5. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28243, amendatory of FLA. STAT. § 84.05 (1951).
6. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28070, arnendator of FLA. STAT. § 104.01 et seq. (1951).
7. Fla. Laws 1951, c 26921, arnendatory of FL.A. STAT. §§ 74.01, 74.03, 74.09 and
74.15 (1949). Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28282, amendatory of FL-. STAT. 73.04 (1951).
8. Hogan v. Martin, 52 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1951); Ashwood v. Patterson. 49 So.2d
,848 (Fla. 1951).
9. Sparkman v. State, 58 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1952).
10. McGriff v. McGill, 62 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1952).
11. National Turpentine and Pulpwood Corp. v. Mills, 57 So.2d 838 (17a. 1952).
12. See infra under proper headings.
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I.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER

Suits for the enforcement of liquidated damage provisions. specific
perfornlalcc of oral contracts to convey and devise, and nincrous litigatioN
involving waiver, estop )el, rescission, and other aspects of contracts involving
the sale of real estate were considered by the Supreme Court during the
past two years.
Liquidated damages.-Beatty v. Flannery,'3 the earliest of three cases
involving a liquidated damage provision, strictly enforced the contract as

written and denied any relief to the defaulting purchaser. This was a
suit by a defaulting vendee against a real estate broker to recover the
earnest money paid on account of the purchase price. The down payment
was $3,000.00 or ten percent of a total price of $30,000.00. The court
found that the vendee was bound to perform because the title was
merchantable, and then asserted: "It is well settled that, even in the
absence of such a forfeiture provision, a vendee in default is not entitled
to recover from the vendor money paid in part performance of an executory
contract." 4 From this principle the court concluded that an express
contract provision to the same effect would not change the monies into
penalties and forfeitures so as to make the defendant allege and prove
actual damages. The court recognized exceptions to this general rule in
cases of fraud or fortuitous misfortunes suffered by the vendee which would
give the vendor a benefit shocking to the court's conscience, bit found
n1o basis for applying an exception inthik ituation. The earliei case o4
Pembroke v. Caudill", was distinguished on the basis that in that case
the vendor was seeking to recover from the vendee the amount stipulated
to be liquidated damages, whereas in the instant- case the money so
stipulated had already been paid to the non-defaulting vendor. That this
.permits 'the avoidance of the first rule by the application of.the second
is conceded, but that it changes the equities of the parties is not apparent.
The second case in the series, Paradis v. Second Avenue Used Car
Company." reached an exactly contrary result on facts which were not
noticeablv distinguishable. Here the earnest money was $4,000 with the
total price being undisclosed. The action was by the purchaser for
rescission with the vendors seeking to retain the down payment as liquidated
damages according to the contract. The court, apparently concluding

that there was no justifiable ground for rescission, allowed the vendee
to gct his money back, but without interest, saying that a provision for
liquidated damages or a pcnalty is not conclusive but is a question of law
13. 49 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1950).
14. Id. at 82. The rights of a defaulting ventdee were the subject of a recent
note in 55 W. VA. L.Q. 291 (1953). See also Corbin, Right of Defaulting Vendee
to the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 A'.un 1.1. 1013 (1931).
15. 160 Fla. 948, 37 So.2d 538 (1948).
16. 61 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1952).
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to be determined by thc court. i'hey cited the case of Pembroke v.
CaudillV whici two 'ears earlier was distinguished in the Beatty , case,
supra. It was stated that the burden was on the vendors to prove
damages suffered for the breach of contract and that they could not justify
the retention of the deposit on the literal terms of the contract without
showing damages or some equity on their part.
The third case involving the liquidated damage question was Haas v.
Crisp Realty Company. 9 In this case some relief was granted to the
defaulting purchaser but the court reverted to the rule of the Beatty2O
case. Here $6,050.00 was paid toward a total price of $15,500.00, the
balance to be obtained from an F.H.A. mortgage. The purchasers were
unable to qualify for the mortgage and the relationship between the
parties rapidly deteriorated until the purchasers brought an action for
rescission based on fraud. After concluding that the purchasers were
not entitled to rescind, the court reversed the lower decision authorizing
the retention of the entire down payment. It stated that under these
facts the deposit must be construed as a penalty rather than valid liquidated
damages. The size of the deposit plus the fact that it was fixed, not b
contemplation of a just compensation for a breach but by reference to a
maximum mortgage commitment, led to this conclusion. 2' The court
approvcd the nile of the Beatty22 case to the effect that a purchaser
in default is not entitled to recover money paid his vendor but pondered
whether the insta nt case merited application of the unjust enrichment
exception to that rule. 23 If the purchasers' default was not wilful], but
only a result of her inability to qualify for the mortgage, the retention of
this large amount by the vendor might well be shocking to the conscience
of the court.

-

.

The tenor. of. these three cases suggest that a provision for the: retention
of payrnetts as liquidated damages does not materially add to the rights
of the vendor. The cases are in accord on the proposition -that such a
provision is not determinative but that the court, as a question of law,
will decide whether the payments are liquidated damages or a penalty.
'rhis seems just and equitable and favorable to the vendee, but the essence
of the rule is circumvented by the more vicious one that a vendee in
default cannot recover from the vendor sums paid on account of the
purchase price. This rule does all that the liquidated damage provision
does and even imorc. It is only where the retention of these payments
would so unjustly cnrich the vcndor that it would be shocking to the
17. See note 15 suira.
IS. See note 13 supra.
19. 65 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1953).
20. Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1950), note 13 supra.
21. Haas v. Criap Realty Co., 65 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1953).
22. See note 20 supra.
2". laas v. Criap Realty Co., 65 So.2d 765, 763 (Fta. 1953).
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court's conscience that the court will grant relief. Some consciences are
'4
not readily shocked. This rule was the basis of decision in the Beatty
and Haas25 cases. It was apparently completely overlooked in the Paradis28
case.

Under the circumstances it is difficult to reach any definitive conclusion
concerning the right of a defaulting vendee to recover any or all of the
payments made. In all probability, however, it seems safe to infer that
the court would be willing to enforce a forfeiture of such an amount up
to at least ten percent of the purchase price. Ten percent is more or less
a customary down payment for Florida real estate transactions. As an
abstract matter of justice, especially in considering the fact that many
of the standard contract forms contain provisions not fully appreciated
by uninformed purchasers, the question might well be asked whether
the forfeiture of such a large sum might not be too great a burden thrust
on unwary vendees as a result of an automatic adherence to an arbitrary
rule of law. The rule requiring the aggrieved party to prove his damages
more nearly approaches exact justice in each case.
Statute of Frauds.-A number of cases involving the specific performance
of oral contracts to convey or devise real estate indicate the degree of
part performance required by the Florida Supreme Court to remove the
contract from the domain of the Statute of Frauds. Cottages Miami Beach
. \Vegian2 delineates the requirements with particularity. In this case
a daughter moved from New York to Miami Beach and managed the
property in reliance on her father's promise to vest one half of the title
in her. The father failed to convey a half interest and she brought suit
against his estate. Judgment for the plaintiff was sustained on the theory
that part performance removed the contract from the Statute of Frauds.
The court stated three rules concerning services and part performance:
a. Services in reliance on an oral promise to convey are not sufficient
to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds if the services are
capable of adequate pecuniary measurement.
b. Services by promissee is ordinarily treated as equivalent to
payment of consideration, and while this is not in itself sufficient
part performance, the rendition of services together with possession
is sufficient to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds.
c. Payment of part or all of the consideration plus taking
28
possession will take the oral contract out of the Statue of Frauds.
Applying these standards to the case at bar, the court concluded
that specific performance should be granted on the basis of rules (b) and
24. See note 20 supra.
25. See note 23 suta.
26. Paradis v. Second Avenue Used Car Co., 61 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1952).

27. 57 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1951). Subsequent litigation reported in 59 So.2d 528
(Fla. 1952).
28. 57 So.2d 439, ,441 (Fla. 1951).
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(c), but that if ruic (a) controlled, specific performance should still be
granted because the services were incapable of pecuniary measurement
owing to the special values decedent placed on his daughter's services,
kinship, trust and confidence. Furthermore, the court concluded that
denial of specific performance would be tantamount to a fraud on the
plaintiff and extremely inequitable since she gave up her home and moved
from a distant city and fully performed her part of the bargain.
Relief was denied in a somewhat similar case29 for the specific
performance of an oral contract to devise real estate in return for services.
In this case the plaintiffs were not relatives, they were in possession only
to the extent of occupancy rent-free with the decedent, they made no
improvements at their expense, and they left decedent in her last illness
ten weeks before her death. The court stated that to enforce a parol gift
of land equity requires:
1. words showing an intent to give the land;
2. possession taken in reliance on the gift;
3. permanent and valuable improvements made by the doneeA0
Obviously, tinder these circumstances the plaintiffs would not be entitled
to relief.
It is to be noted that the court treated this as a parol gift of land
and not as a parol contract to convey. Of course, the agreement was to
devise or to convey by will, but it is not apparent that this makes it a
gift since the devisees had to earn the property or pay consideration in the
form of services. Had the court treated it as a contract of purchase
rather than gift, however, the result would still be the same. Applying
the standards of Cottages Miami Beach,3 1 it is apparent that the services
of the plaintiffs were not so peculiarly beneficial to the decedent as to
be incapable of pecuniary measurement, the plaintiffs did not take possession
and dominion of the premises, and they ceased rendering services when
decedent needed them most. Hence, specific performance should be
denied in either case.
Burton v. Keatona32 involved an oral contract to devise real estate in
return for services, and the court, quite correctly it seems, applied the test
of Cottages Miami Beach"' rather than the tests for a parol gift. The
court stated that more stringent proof was required in cases involving oral
contracts to devise than in oral contracts to convey because of the fact
that one of the parties is now dead. However, specific performance was
granted because of services rendered and possession taken in reliance on
the oral agreement.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Green v. Price, 63 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1953).
Id. at 338.
57 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1951).
60 So.2d 770 (Fla. 1952).
See note 31 suwra.
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Installment land contract.-Thc relationship between the parties in an
installment land contract received judicial exposition in Savage v. forner"4
and Carlton Estate v. KellerY" In the Savage case the purchaser brought
an action for rescission and the vendor moved for a dismissal on the
grounds that there was an abandonlment of the contract on the part of

the vendee. After finding that there was no complete and utter
abandonment, the court pointed out that it contained no forfeiture
provision and that time was not declared to be of the essence. The
vendor gave no notice to the vendee of any election in respect to his
breach until after the vendee tendered the amount due under the contract.
Under these facts it was held that the plaintiff vendee was entitled to
rescission under the general rule that a vendee, although previously in
default, may tender performance prior to a declared forfeiture. " The
conclusion was bolstered by thc fact that the vendors had treated the
contract as still in existence by pledging it as collateral. There were no
circumstances justifying dispensing with the necessity of giving the vendee
notice of default and forfeiture.
In tle Carlton "7 case the contract contained provision for forfeiturc
if any of three annual payments of $1000 were not paid within 60 days
of due date. None of thesc three payments were made, but the vendor
(lid accept interest payments. A few months before the final payment
was due the vendor l)rfoclIred the dccd fron the escrow agent, conveyed
IIhe land to another purchaser, and notified the original vendee to vacatc.
IJudvi thesc circunistatues it was held that the vendor had waived thi
trict performance of the contract requiring annual payments. He thus
precluded himself from declaririg a forfeiture without riotice to the vendee
and without offering. the. vendee a reasonable opportunity to make the
delinquent. payments. . The court oheluded that under tWe fats of the
case a waiver of the veirdor's rights ere. i....d..rather, Wan al. esoppel.
Ti' clihalcellor's decree, giing the vendee in possession tvety-bne davs
to place herself in good standing, and stating that upon the completion
of future payments she would be entitled to a warranty deed, was affirmed.
It was stated that this net result can be sustained on principles of either
waiver or estoppel in spite of technical differcnces. The court explained
that after a waiver the vendor can either sue on the contract for the
amounts due or bring an action to foreclose his lien. After an estoppel,
Ilie vendor can recover his rights by giving a plOpcr notice to the vendee.

III either case the vendee is protected.
Miscellancous.-In a number of other dccisions involving contracts
for the sale of land it was held: that the existence of a forfeiture provision
34.
35.
36.
37.

49 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1950).
52 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1951).
Savage v. Homer, 49 So.2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1950).
Carlton Estate v. Keller, 52 So.2d 131 (Via. 1951).
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as liquidated damages does not deprive the contract of that degree of
mutuality which is essential for specific performance;3 8 that a contract
must be signed by two witnesses but need not be acknowledged in order
to entitle it to be specifically enforced; ' that the insertion of a clause
by the prospective vendee requiring the vendor to furnish an abstract of
title constituted a counter-offer and not an acceptince: 40 that existence
of al encroachment by a building on the land conveed does not justify
rcscission after the deed was delivered because the question of marketability
of title as an excuse for non-performance is significant only whilc the
contract is executory; 4' that a vendor cannot complain if he gets a more
favorable offer than lie is entitled to under the contract;42 that where
o decree is based on conflicting evidence, it is conclusive on the appellate
court in the absence of a showing that it was clearly wrong or that an
inapplicable rule of law influenced the decision; 43 that it is error not
to grant specific performance where a contract is found to exist and
to have been partially performed; 44 and that specific performance shotld
be decreed of a contract to cancel by will a note and mortgage.S Specific
performance was quite properly denied in South Investment Company v.
Norton" where the optionee under a lease was seven years in default.
'he court found that there was a complete abandonment of the agreement

and not simply a waiver of strict performance or estoppel. A truthful
statement of a present intention with regard to a future act does not
form the basis for an estoppel. 47 Enforcement was likewise refused inl
McCloskey v. Johnson48 after the vendor was unable to obtain the discharge
of a federal tax lien, the court observing that it would be difficult to
conceivc of a blacker cloud on the title.

Jermak v. Fisher"lheld that

after a rescission action had been voluntarily dismissed it was error to
continue the case in reference to the broker's claim for a commission since
this was simply a legal action without basis for cquitablc relief. A contract
provision concerning risk of loss was construed in Triple E. Development
Comipany v. Floridagold Citrus Corp)oration,50) and in Bell v. Thovnpson ,"
the vendee's divorced second wife who completed the payments and received
the deed was required to convey a one half interest to the first wife upon
her reimbursing the second wife one half of the redemption price.
;8.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44,
45.
46.

Romines v.Nobles, 55 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1951).
Abercrombie v. Eidschun, 66 So.2d 875 (Fla. 1N53).
Mehler v. luston, 57 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1952).

Johnson v,Green, 54 So,2d 14 (FI. 1951).
Stoffer %-.
Adams, 54 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1951).
Knowles v.Benson. 61 So,2d 365 (Fla. 1953).
Saeger v.Roberts, 54 So.2d 157 (Fla, 1951).
Ludwig v. Lansdowne, 65 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1953).
57 So.2d I (Fla. 1952).

47. Ibid.

48. 54 So.2d 517
49. 54 So.2d 243
50. 51 So.2d 435
51. 63 So.2d 491

(Fla. 1951).
(Fla. 1951).
(Fla. 1951).
(Fla. 1953).
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A deed was declared a mortgage and the transaction usurious in
Burket v. Johnson."2 In this case Johnson desired to purchase King's
land for $900, and Johnson, having only $100, sought a loan from Bnrkct
who agreed to the transaction and accepted Johnson's $100. Burket then
purchased the land for $900, the warranty deed designating his wife as
grantee, and then entered into a contract to convey the land to Johnson
for $1325 payable $15 per week with interest at ten per cent after maturity.
At the completion of the payments Bnrket refused to convey unless he
was paid interest, and Johnson brought suit. It was held that the
transaction was a loan and that the plaintiff was entitled to a conveyance
of the land plus a return of the entire loan, $1225,63 as the transaction
violated the usury statute.'4
Fraud.-Two cases considered the problem of what constitutes
sufficient fraud or misrepresentation by the seller to justify rescission
on the part of the purchaser. Both cases denied relief to the purchaser
when the defendant vendor gave an opportunity for inspection and
investigation even though the assertions were not true. In both cases
the action was brought after the sale had been consummated. In Davis
v. Dunn" the sellers and their agent represented that the house was free
from termites when in fact it was seriously infested. In McDonald v. Rose"
the misrepresentations concerned the amount of income to be derived
from an apartment house, the degree of occupancy, the designation cf
a muddy bayou as a beach, and certain mis-statements concerning the
furniture in one of the apartments. The negotiations covered a period
of approximately three months during which time the vendees made
some inspections and could have made more. The basis for the decisions
is that the purchaser is not justified in relying on the vendor's assertions
when he is given an opportunity to investigate. On the other hand,
however, in Schwartz v. Nizolekf t it was held that although equity would
not relieve against a bad bargain (apparently there were not sufficient
misrepresentations to permit rescission), still it would not specifically
enforce the performance of a contract where to do so would be harsh
and inequitable under all circumstances.
11.

DEEDS,

)ELIVERY,

VALIDITY, REFORMATION

Legislation.-Changes in the statutory law relating to deeds during
the past two years consisted of the enactment of a new curative statute
and the amendment of two statutes 0 involving curative provisions and the
52.
5 .
;4.
55.
56.
57.
58.

61 So.2d 197 (Fia. 1952).
Id. at 198.
FLA. STAT. § 687.07 (1951).
58 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1952).
50 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1951).
62 So.2d 704 (F1. 1953).
Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28208.
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formalities of acknowledgment. The new statute enacted by Chapter
28208, Laws of 1953, raises a presumption that persons are the same
when similar names vary on instruments affecting title to the same parcel
of real property. It is required that the instruments be on record for
ten years and that there is some similarity between the names. The act
specifically applies to instances where the variation may consist of the
use of a full name on one instrument and the use of initials or shortened
name on the other. Florida Statutes Section 694.08, curing defects iii
ackuoweldgment, witnessing or sealing, has been amended 0 so as to validate
instruments issued in a representative or official capacity in which the
word "as" was omitted before the title of the person executing the
instrument. It is still required that the instrument be on record for seven
years before the defect is cured. Florida Statutes Section 695.03, subsection
1, relating to the formalities of acknowledging instruments within the
state, has been amended 0 ' by permitting such acknowledgment before a
judge of a small claims court. All such acknowledgments heretofore or
hereafter made are validated.
Effectiveness of deeds.-Among a number of cases involving the
effectiveness of deeds, Robertson v. Robertsonc2 seems particularly
interesting. In this case the sister of an owner of real property forged
a deed to herself and then placed two mortgages on the land to secure
indebtedness of hers aggregating $10,500. Part of the proceeds was used
to pay off a $2000 balance of an existing mortgage. After the fraud was
discovered the owner of the land asserted that he would recognize the
forged deed as his own and accepted a reconveyance by the forger, this
deed reciting that it was subject to the two mortgages and that the
grantee assumed and agreed to pay them. It was held by a four to three
decision that lie was entitled to a decree cancelling the mortgages, being
obligated to make restitution only to the extent that the proceeds were
used to pay his old mortgage.63
Of course, the forged deed was in its inception a nullity and of no
effect. Although ratification was not discussed there is a recognized line
of authority which asserts that there can be no ratification of a forgery.'
This is based on two principles-one, that the forger is not purporting
to act on behalf of a principal, and the other, that it is against public
policy to permit ratification of a criminal act because it tends to stifle
prosecution."! The above arguments do not apply to estoppel, however,
and, in a proper case, the former owner may be estopped to deny the
59.
60
61.
62.
63.

Fia. Laws 1951, c. 26957; Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28225.
Fa. Laws 1951, c. 26957.
Fla. Laws 1953, c 28225.
61 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1952).
Ibid.
64. MECHEM, OIUTINES or AGE-cY 147 (3d ed. 1952).
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forgery. Various types of estoppel were considered and their application
denied in the instant case.
It was held in this case that the owner of the land was not estoppcd
by the recitals in the deed to the effect that it was given subject to the
existing mortgages because he was not claiming through this deed. ," lie
was claiming under his former title. It is only where a person claims
title under a deed that lie is estopped by the recitals therein. It was aho
held that equitable estoppel inpais was inapplicable because there was no
detrimental change of position in reliance on the owner's conduct. 7 The
court thought that there was no change of position in reliance on the
owner's misconduct since the mortgages were given before he attempted
to recognize the forged deed or accept the deed back to him.
The court considered the rule that a grantee in a deed containing
an assumption clause incurs a contractual liability for the debt and becomes
lie primary obligor. This rule, however, was held inapplicable if there
were no valid consideration or if there were a failure of considerationl 4
The majority held that the fact that the deed cleared the record title
was not a sufficient consideration to support tlhe contractual liability of
;assuming the mortgages. It was also held that the prior suits to foreclose
lhe mortgages wcrc different causes of action and not res adjudicata.
The dissenting opinions thought that the mortgagces should bc
protected on principles of contractual liability and estoppel'
One opinion found ample consideration for the contractual liability
of the grantee under the assumption clause. It was pointed out
that the owner was getting his title cleared, that his old mortgage had
been satisfied, and somc beuefit was probably being received by his sister.
The other opinion would have found an estoppel but did not explain
the objections of the majoritv; namely, that lie was not claiming through
this deed and that there was no change of position by the mortgagees mi
reliance on his misconduct. Obviously, the case is a difficult one and
either result can be rationalized. It is believed that the decision makes
110 fundamental changes in existing law and that it will not, to ally great
extent, increase the hazard of the title examiner. However, grantees and
mortgagecs claiming through deeds that are subsequently discovered to
have been forged must take notice that they cannot rely on any subsequent
purported ratifictaion or adoption. They will have to insist oil a new
:and genuine deed from the owner to the grantee of the forged deed.
Cancellation, fraud.-It was held in Sand v,Hike-, that equity could
grant relief even in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence,
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

'I'IFPANY, Acrx "v132-135 (2d ed.

61 So.2d 499, 503 (Fla. 1952).
Id. at 504.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 504-505.
56 Sn.2d 462 (Fla. 19Q).

1924).
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violation of confidence, or other inequitable conduct if the grantor of
the deeds was mistaken as to the legal effect of the instruments signed.
This was justified in the particular case because it was obvious that the
grantor, unable to speak English and unable to converse with the attorney
who prepared the instruments, had no intent to convey the land. Hence,
the deeds would be ineffective for lack of delivery. The court added,
however, that there was also ample ground to find fraudulent inducement
in the non-disclosure of material facts by the grantee who was aware
of the nature of the transaction, and also that there was a breach of
the fiduciar, relationship between the grantee son and the grantor
mother. 71 Brass v. Reed72 held that assertions of fraud by one of the
grantees against another did not constitute a cloud on his title so as to
enable him to bring a quiet title suit when the asserting grantee admitted that
she received only the interest that the deed purported to convey to her.
Delivery.-Some basic prinicples involving the effectiveness of deeds
were involved in the cases of Mayer v. Mayer.7" It was indicated, and
correctly so, that an interlineation after a deed had been delivered for the
purpose of changing the estate of the grantee would be null and void
unless the deed were re-executed at that time. 74 In fact, even a re-execution
would seem to be without effect unless the land had been previously
conveyed back to the grantor. The deed must take effect presently on
delivery and cannot subsequently be changed.
The court then raised the question of conditional delivery and
remanded the case. On retrial it was concluded that there was no delivers
and this finding of the chancellor was affirmed."
The result may be
desirable but the application of the theory of conditional delivery seems
somewhat strained. The deed was given by a wife to her husband before
he became her husband and while he was married to another person.
It was after his marriage to the grantor that the interlineation by adding
his new wife's name as a grantee for the purpose of making them
tenants by the entireties took place. The theory of the decision was that
the deed was delivered conditioned upon the grantor being named as
one of the grantees in such manner as to create an estate by the entireties.
The condition having failed, the grantor., subsequent wife, remained the
absolute owner.
71. Ibid. In Selley %.Buses, 66 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1952), a suit for the cancellation
of a deed because of undue influence, it was held that the chancellor's decree should
be sustained if there was evidence to support the decision. Taylor v. Con,, 53 So.2d 280
(Fla. 1951), concerning the cancellation of deeds for fraudulent representations, was
decided on the admissibility of parol evidence.
72. 64 So.2d 646 (Fia. 1953).
73. 61 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1952); 54 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1951).
74. 54 So.2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1951).
75. 61 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1952). In Bould v. Coe, 63 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1953), a
deed was also cancelled on the basis of no delivery. In Trowbridge v. Guaranty Trust
Company, 53 So.2d 102 (Fla.

ineffective for lack of delivery.
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In view of the facts that the grantor and grantee were not husband
and wife, that the grantee was the husband of another person, and that
the grantor was not listed as co-grantee, it does not seem logical that
the parties intended to create an estate by the entireties at that time. If
they did intend to create such an estate at such a future date as it would
be legally possible to do so, it would seem that the rule prohibiting a
grantee from acting as escrow agent 76 would have to be circumvented to
sustain the result. This rule prohibiting delivery of a deed to a grantee
to become effective on condition might be avoided by distinguishing
between a condition precedent and a condition subsequent,7 7 by limiting
the rle so as not to prevent one of several grantees from being an escrow
agent, 78 or by an outright repudiation of the unsatisfactory rule.79 This
rule was not discussed and the case does not seem too satisfactory.
Another case involving an interlineation of a deed already executed,
as well as the Statute of Uses, was McGrieff v.McGill.8 Land was conveyed
to "S. D. McGill as trustee for S. D. McGill II." Later, S. D. McGill,
the trustee, inserted the words "with full power to sell or mortgage"
after his name and re-recorded the deed. After the death of S. D. McGill,
a deed to McGrieff was recorded and S. D. McGill II brought a suit to
quiet title. It was correctly held that title should be quieted in S. D.
McGill II. Since the deed when delivered provided for a dry trust which
was executed tinder the Statute of Uses, McGill II acquired both legal
and equitable title. Hence, the subsequent alteration by the feoffec to
uses was of no effect and McGrieff took nothing from the deed to him.
Recording.-Several cases involved the construction of the recording
act and the bona fide purchase concept. In accord with well established
principles it was held that a divorce decree constituted constructive notice
of the son's interest in real property, and a subsequent mortgagee from the
father and former owner did not obtain a lien on the premises. 8 '
Furthermore, the possession by the son with his mother for seven years
constituted implied actual notice of the son's interest.8 2 Similarly, the
existence of a narrow road across the premises charged the purchaser with
notice under the theory of implied actual notice 3 of the extent of the
town's interest, even though the proceedings by which the county had
76. 7 T"iozulso r, REAL PROPEWr 665 (1940). For a summary of the law
relating to delivery of deeds inescrow, see Comment, 8 -\I1sA3m L.Q. 75 (1953).
77. BuRaR, REAl., PitoP E-RTrY 400 (1943).
78. London Freehold and Leasehold Property Co. v. Suffield, 2 Oh. 608,
621 (1897).
79. Lerner Shops of North Carolina, Inc. v.Rosenthal,
225 N.C. 316, 34 S.E.2d
206 (1945); 4 TIFFANY,

REAL PROPERTY

229 (3d ed. 1939).

80. 62 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1952).
81. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'| v.Fisher, 66 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1952).
The effect of the Florida recording act isdiscussed ina Comment, 6 MTMui L.Q. 595

(1952.

Ibid.

83. Zaneha v. Town of Medley, 66 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1953).
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previously acquired the right were not recorded. The purchaser was put
on inquiry and should have ascertained the extent of the public's interests.
Covenants for title, rniscellaneous.-Thc construction of covenants
It was therein held that the
existence of a public highway and appurtenant drainage ditch was impliedly
excepted from the covenants in a statutory warranty deed. The case did
not specifically discuss which covenants were involved but the decision is
in line with a previous Florida holding 5 and a well recognized line of
authority 8 that visible easements are impliedly excepted from the covenant
against encumbrances. The decision is also in accord with the general
American view that such a covenant is a present covenant and breached
immediately if at all."7 Mandamus vas granted to compel the county to
issue a deed for land after it was advertised for sale and bid in at public
auction. 8 Quite correctly it was held that an attempted dedication after
such proceeding occurred too late as the land had already been sold. As
in other cases where masterships are employed, the decision of a master
in a suit to reform a deed will be sustained if there is ample testimony
to support his conclusions.8s9
The rights of an heir and a judgment creditor purchaser at execution
consummated after the death of the debtor were determined in Beitler v.
Turner.90 It was decided that an execution issued in the name of
deceased who died after entry of a final judgment but before the entry of
a final execution was valid. The sheriff's deed, consequent upon such
execution, was also valid and the purchaser was entitled to the land. The
result was reached primarily upon the authority of Section 45.16 Florida
Statutes, which provides that the death of either party after a verdict
will not render subsequent litigation void. The court supported the
decision under both the old 9 ' and the new rules9 2 authorizing an attorney
for title was required in Deeb v. Kestner.8 4

to have a writ of scire facias issued upon a judgment.

The determinative factor in deciding the title to certain public lands
was the statute governing legislative procedure providing that each act
contain in its title an indication of its content. In Bird Key Corp. v.
Sarasota," it was held that the part of the statute setting up the city
government of Sarasota which gave the city title to certain lands was
84. 59 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1952'.

The Florida law on this subject is discussed in

a Comment, 7 MtAti L.Q. 378 (1953),
85. Van Ness v. Royal Phosphate Co., 60 Fla. 284. 53 So. 381 (1910).
86. RAWLE, TilE LAW OF COVENANTS FOR "IITr 117 (3d ed. 1860); 4 'l'WFANY,
RE ii. PROPERTY 143-144 (3d ed. 1939).
87. 3 AMICAN L.,w ti. PROPER!ry 462 (1952).
88. State ex rel \Vadkins v. Owens, 62 So.2d 403 (,la. 195;).
89. Hopping v. Lovejoy, 53 So.2d 704 (Ia. 1951).

90. 61 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1952).
91. FLA. STAT. c. 657 (1951), Common Law Rule 50, Author's Comment (1944).
92. FLA. STAT. C.657 (1951). Common law Rule 50 (1944).
93 54 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1951).
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unconstitutional because it violated this statute. Since the title of the
act only indicated that it contained provisions for a city government and
indicated no intent to divest the state of its title to certain lands, the
title to the lands remained in the state.
Land conveyed and disputed boundaries.-Disputes over the location
of boundaries to land frequently involve many legal principles, such as
adverse possession, construction of deeds, acquiesence, and proper remedies.
In construing the deed to determine what land was conveyed it is a
well established principle that the survey made at or shortly after the
deed was executed will control.04 Such boundaries as thus established
become the true boundaries and subsequent parties are bound thereto
irrespective of errors made. This principle was reaffirmed in Akin v.
Godwin" wherein it seemed particularly applicable. The 1914 deeds
conveyed the land "according to the Knowlton survey." The dispute
arose because of a more recent survey which did not go back to the original
field notes or boundary lines of the original survey. Tle court aptly pointed
out that in making a re-survey, the question is not where an entirely
accurate survey would locate the lines, but where the original survey did
locate such lines. The object of a re-survey is to locate the lost lines or
monuments, not to dispute the correctness of or to control the original
survey. "Purchasers of town lots generally have the right to locate their
lot lines according to the stakes as actually set by the platter of the lots,
and no subsequent survey can unsettle such lines. In the event of a
subsequent controversy the question becomes not whether the lots were
located with absolute accuracy but whether the lots were purchased and
possession taken in reliance upon them. If such was the case, the rule
appears to be well established that they must govern notwithstanding any
errors in locating them.""" Tyner v.MlcDonald 7 approved the rule that
where a plat shows specific frontage of each lot except for one, any
deficiency in the width of the block will be reflected in the width
of that lot.
The distinction between ejectment and suits to quiet title was explained
in Stark v. Frayer.08 Generally, equity will not take jurisdiction to settle
boundary disputes unless there are some additional grounds for distinct
equitable jurisdiction."', Quiet title is the proper remedy where the
plaintiff is in possession and the adversary had previously asserted in a
judicial proceeding an adverse claim. This is true even though the
94. 3 AmRICAN LAw OF PROPE RTY 425-427 (1952). Akin v. Godwin, 49 So.2d
604 (Fla. 1951 Cowgil v,Hopkins, 52 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1951): Hall v.Hanford, 66 So.2d

474 (Fla. 1953,.

95. 49 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1951).
96. Id. at 607 quoting from 8 Amt. JuR. 787 (1937).
97. 63 So.2d 504 (Fa.1953).
98. 67 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1953). See also the companion case of Stark V.Marshall,
67 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1953).
99. Id. at 239.
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proceeding has terminated without a determination on the merits since
such an assertion constitutes a cloud on title which a court of equity
will either confirm or remove. A general assertion that a defendant is
claiming an indefinitely described strip along the boundary line is not
sufficient to show a cloud over which equity should take jurisdiction.""'
Facts must be alleged which give the claim apparent validity as well as
those which show its invalidity? 0'
As will be pointed out below, 0' - title to the disputed portion can be
established by adverse possession, but the party relying on such title must
show that he complied with all the statutory requirements in effect while
his title was being perfected, and that he intended to hold up to the boundary
whether it was the true boundary or not. 03 The boundary may be settled
by acquiesence in a line established after a dispute. 0 4 This boundary
may be established even by parol and is considered to be outside the
Statute of Frauds.105 The boundary becomes the division line on the
basis that such line is the true line and not because of adverse possession. 08
Before the doctrine is applicable, however, it must be established that
there was a dispute, a settlement, and an acquicsence. 01 Acquiesence need
not be for the statutory period, 08 but acquiesenee in a parol-established
0
boundary will not satisfy the requirements in the absence of a disputc. 9
I1l.
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'feuaucy by entireties.-lii the past two years the court had occasion
to decide several problems concerning estates in land, among the most
interesting of which was the effect of murder on the estate by the entireties." 0°
After reviewing the conflicting opinions in other jurisdictions the court
decided to follow the rationale of the Missouri Courts"1 to the effect that
O0.Stark v. Frayer, 67 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1953).
101. Id. at 239.
102. See Adverse possession infra.
103. May v. Holley, 59 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1952); Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261.
14 So. 505 (1894).
104. Euse v. Gibbs, 49 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1951); Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 14
So. 805 (1894).
105. Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 14 So. 805 (1894).
2 TiFFANY, .REAL
PROPERTY 678 (3d ed. 1939).
106. Eusc v. Gibbs, 49 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1951); Watrous v.Morrison, 33 'a.261,
14 So. 805 (1894).
107. Shaw v.Williams, 50 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1950).
108. Watrous v. Morrison, 33 la. 261, 14 So. 805 (1894).
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confused the doctrines of acquiescence and adverse possession inShaw v.Williams, ibid,
inas much as there was considerable discussion of acquiescence for the statutory period.
That some states require acquiescence for the statutory period, see 2 TirFANY,
PROPERTY
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violent homicide by one spouse terminates the tenancy in much the same
way as a divorce, and renders the parties tenants in common. 1 - This
intermediate position of the Florida Court has the advantage of neither
allowing the wrongdoer to profit from his wrongful act nor to completely
deprive him of property which was rightfully his.
Three suits involved the title to land, purportedly conveyed to create
a tenancy by the entireties, where the grantees were parties to a bigamous
marriage. In the first case of Malisk v. Dion' 13 an undivorced man and
the woman with whom he lived as husband and wife acquired land in
both their names as husband and wife. It was held that they were tenants
in common and that on the husband's death his one-half interest descended
to his real wife. His illegitimate son could not inherit because there
was no written acknowledgment of parentage.
In the later case of Alexander v. Colston"t4 a contrary result was
reached on principles of estoppel. In this case the man deceived his second
"wife" by going through a ceremonial marriage, while apparently in the
previous case any second marriage had to be based on common law. After
the death of the husband a dispute arose between his second "wife" and
his rightful heirs emanating from the valid marriage. It was held that
as to the land purportedly conveyed to the parties as estates by the
entireties, the second "wife" should be deemed the absolute owner on
principles of estoppel. The deceased pcrprctrator of the fraud would be
estopped to deny the validity of the second marriage, and his heirs, taking
through hint, would likewise be estoppcd. As to a parcel of land conveyed
to the husband alone, his rightful heirs, according to the first and only
valid marriage, prevailed.
In the third case"" involving bigamous marriages, the land in dispute
had been owned by the second "wife" and then conveyed to create an
estate by the entireties after the spouse entered into the bigamous marriage.
Later, at her death he assumed ownership as survivor. He subsequently
went through another marriage ceremony, attempted to create a new
tenancy by the entireties with his new "wife" whom he later divorced,
the decree providing that the parties should be tenants in common. Later
the daughters of the original owner of the land, his wife in the first
bigamous marriage, brought suit to void the conveyance by their mother
and all subsequent conveyances in order that they might be declared owners.
This suit was compromised with the daughters settling for a one-half
interest. The net result of the compromise was that the heirs of the
224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
112.
848 (Fla.
13.
114.
115.

hlogan v. Martin, 52 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1951); As iwood v. Patterson, 49 So.Zd
1951). See Comment, 7 MIAWim L.Q. 524,
62 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1952).
66 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1953).
Nottingham v. Denison, 63 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1953).
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original grantor received half and the other half was divided between
the "husband" and his divorced third "wife," the after acquired title of
the husband inuring to him and her as tenants by the entireties and
the divorce decree making them tenants in common. 1 6
In other cases involving estates by the entireties it was held: that a
divorce ipso facto makes the parties tenants in common and that it is
error to require them to mutually quit claim interests in portions of the
land to each other;"17 that so long as the parties are not divorced both
are entitled to possession;" 8 and that such an estate is not subject to
19
execution for the debts of the husband.'
Co-tenancy.-Two cases involving bank accounts held that the
particular contract created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.' 20
These cases seem to evidence less hostility toward such estates than an
earlier one'" which found no such survivorship estate. Similarly, it was
held by the construction of partnership articles that a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship was created) 22 The interesting feature of this case
is that the partnership articles were excuted at a time when the law of
Florida prohibited such an estate. However, the court concluded that, by
continuing to operate under the articles subsequent to the amendment of
Section 689.15 in 1941, the parties ratified the agreement and thereby
23
created a valid joint tenancy with right of survivorship.1
The rights of cotenaits inpartition actions received judicial clarification
inseveral instances. Partition suits are initiated by a bill in chancery 24
'Ind the equity court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to grant complete
relief can settle the equities between the parties.'" In Potter v. Garrett'26
it was held that a daughter who had expended money during the lifetime
of the parents for the preservation of the homestead was entitled to
contribution out- of her sister's portion of the land. The sister, however,
was held entitled to a credit of one half the reasonable rental value of the
premises during the period it was occupied by the other after the death
of the last parent.

No mention was made of either the general common

law rule that a cotenant in possession is not liable to account

27

or the

rule that a cotenant expending money on improvements cannot compel
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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a contribution in the absence of an express agrccinent. 1 ' The instant
case, however, is much more equitable.
A purchasing cotenant is entitled to set off his interest against the
price bid, 12"1 and an outstanding tax title acquired by some cotenants
inures to the benefit of all and simply constitutes as a matter of law
the payment of taxes rather than establishing an independent chain of
title to the exclusion of the others. 30 This is in accord with the general
principle of fiduciary obligations between cotenants."'
Dower: Legislation.-Section 1 of Statute 731.34 defining the extent
of the right of dower was amended by Chapter 28222 of the Laws of 1953.
The amendment provides that if the deceased died intestate and left no
lineal descendants but a widow claiming dower, then the property of
the decedent not included in the widow's dower shall descend to her
subject to the debts of the decedent except that the homestead shall descend
with the exemption provided by the constitution. Section 731.35 governing
the procedure for the election of dower was amended by Chapter 26948
of the Laws of 1951. This amendment provides that a guardian of a
widow under disabilities may file an election to take dower on her behalf
and vests in the county judge the discretion to grant or deny the election
as the best interests of the widow may appear. The act also provides that
if a widow should die without filing an election within the period, then
it may be filed by any person who has a beneficial interest in the estate
of such deceased widow. The election shall be granted or denied by the
county judge as the best interest of thc parties entitled to participate il
the estate of the deceased widow may require.
Several cases involving dower were decided by the court during this
period. In the first case'3 2 the widow dissented from her husband's will
and elected to take her statutory dower. She and the commissioners had
agreed that she should take her entire one-third interest out of the
personalty since it was inconvenient to divide the realty. It was held by
a divided court that she could not do this since dower was a creature of
statute and the statute had to be followed explicity, that is, she must
take one third of the realty and one third of the personalty.13'
In another case'" a widow, long separated from her husband, elected
to take a child's portion in lieu of dower and at the same time claim
dower in lands which her husband had conveyed without her joining
128. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 283 (3d ed. 1939). Of course, here the money
was expended before the land descended to the cotenants. Also a cotenant is entitled
to contribution for reasonable expenditures necessary for the preservation of the property.
2' TIFFANY, RIEAL PROPERTY 278 (3rd ed. 1939).
129. Grable v. Nuney, 66 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1953).
130. McQueen.v. Forsythe, 55 So.2d 545 (Fla. 9 i l.
131. 2 lIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 287 (3d. ed. 1939).
132. Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 50 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1951).
133. Ibid.
134. Johnson v. tlayes, 52 So.2d 109 (FIa. 199 I).
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in thc decd. 'Ilie widow and the decedent's son entered into a compromise
in regard to the property owned by the decedent at his death, and then,
when his estate was settled, she filed her extraordinary petition for the
assignment of dower in the lands that had previously been conveyed.
Her petition was dismissed with prejudice and she then filed a suit in
chancery seeking the identical result. It was held against the widow
on three grounds: (1), the unappealed judgment of the county court
which had jurisdiction was a final adjudication of the matter; (2), she
was estopped by her conduct in delaying to assert her claim until after
her husband's estate was closed so that no claim for breach of warranty
could be filed against her late husband's estate; and (3), when she elected
to take a child's part in lieu of dower, she thereby expressly estopped herself
from claiming any dower either in the estate owned by the husband at
his death or in the land he previously conveyed. a'5
In another case' 36 involving dower, the widow was allowed to claim
dower in the entire sum realized from the sale of her husband's realty
without allowance for a purchase money mortgage. This occurred,
however, because evidence of the purchase money mortgage was not
introduced in the trial court, hence there was no evidence properly
before the court by which they could determine that error had been
committed.
Miscellaneous,-In a case 31 7 wherein property was devised to executors,
including the wife, "to be controlled, used, pledged, mortgaged or sold
in any manner that in her careful judgment may seem to be to the best
interest of herself and to the estate so long as she remains single," it was
held that the wife had a valid fee simple determinable on her staying
single with an absolute power of sale so that grantees of the executor
would receive valid fee simple titles. The result giving grantees a clear title
is undoubtedly correct as obviously the wife did have an absolute power
of sale regardless of the exact nature of the estate-whether a life estate
or fee simple determinable, and whether legal or equitable. 'lhe exercise
of the power of sale would give the grantees good title. A conveyance
to a grantee "for and during his natural life and at his death title to invest
in his heirs" created a fee simple absolute 38 under the doctrine of the
Rule in Shelley's ease. Naturally, the deed had been executed prior to
the abrogation of the rule in 1945.1'"1 In a case' 40 involving the construction
of a will, it was held that devises to three separate persons of three different
houses by street and number only was valid even though all three houses
135. Ibid.
136. In re Vidal's Estate. Yanes v. Vidal, 67 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1953).

137. Raulerson v.Saffold, 61 So.2d 926 (Fla. 1952).
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were on the same parcel of land. The three devisecs look as telants in
common until division was perfected.
Homestead.-The troublesome problem of what constitutes a homestead required Supreme Court determination in several instances during
the past two years. Two of these cases involving property of a decedent
were particularly interestiug. In Wilson v. Florida National Bank and
Trust Company"' the dispute arose between a widow claiming dower
and the daughter claiming the land under the statute providing for the
descent of homesteads. The decedent had owned forty acres, five acres
of which had been held jointly with his wife as tenants by the entireties,
and the other thirty-five had been owned individually by him. The home
was located on the five acre tract.
The dispute arose when the widow dissented from the will and elected
statutory dower, asserting such right against the thirty-five acres. Of course,
the title to the five acre tract vested iii her as the surviving tenant of
the entireties. It was held that the entire forty acre tract constituted the
homestead of the deceased," '-' and hence the thirty-five acre tract descended
to the daughter as a lineal descendant subject to a life estate in favor of
the widow. The court explained that all homesteads terminate at the
death of the head of the family unless a new homestead is established
thereafter. Hence, the fact that there was no building on the thirty-five
acre tract was immaterial. The status of the land as homestead or not
is determined at the time of death.
Passmore v. Morrisonll likewise involved the devolution of realty
and the determination of whether certain land constituted a homestead.
In this case the owners of the land, Colonel and Mrs. Passmore, adopted
a'son when he was nine months old. The boy became a problem at the
age of three and rapidly progressed in his deviations so that he frequently
required detention in various juvenile schools of correction. Twice the
Passmores had consented to the boy's adoption by his paternal grandmother
but the proposed adoption never materialized. In 1951 Colonel Passmore
died and three months later his wife passed away. The boy had not
lived at home for two years prior to the death of his adoptive parents. The
land had been owned by the Passmores as tenants by the entireties so
that Mrs. Passmore became the absolute owner on the death of her
husband. Under these facts it was held by a divided court that the land
was not a homestead at the death of Mrs. Passmore.-' 'Therefore, her
devisee took to the exclusion of the adopted son.
The decision is readily sustainable but the concurring opinion of
141. 64 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1953).
142. Ibid.
143. 63 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1953).
144. Id. at 299.
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Judge Drewt ' seems to be the clearer explanation. The death of the
Colonel vested title in his widow as surviving tenant of the cntiretics and
terminated his homestead as it necessarily does in every instance. Hence,
the problem for determination became whether the property acquired
the status of a homestead while it was owned individually by the widow.
'[lie majority felt that it did not. It has been held that to constitute
a homestead there must be at least two persons who live together in
the relation of one family, one of whom must be the head of the
family." ', In the instant case there does not seem to have been such
a factual relationship during the time that Mrs. Passmore owned the
land. The son had been absent for some time, apparently was deriving
no suport from the mother, and apparently was not bound to her by
any mutual ties of filial love and affection.
It may be well to point out that neither the constitution nor the
statutes specifically define a homestead for purposes of descent. The
Florida Constitution provides for a homestead real property taxation
exemption' 4 " and also for a homestead right of exemption from a forced
sale by ereditors., 4 8 These two concepts are quite distinct. Since the
statute providing for the descent of homesteads 49 does not explain the
term, resort must be had to the above mentioned categories to determine
the nature of the homestead in property devolution cases. The taxation
exemption provisions seem sui generis and clearly inapplicable. Thus, the
crc(litor exemption criteria are controlling.
'[his exemption fromi execution has been defined as a personal righl
which may be waived and which does not attain the characteristics of an
estate. 1 0 It is for the protection of the family and may be asserted by
those beneficiaries at the death of the family head.'
Although the
homestead exemption right is personal, the property over which it may
be asserted seems to undergo a certain metamorphosis by which it
acquires characteristics of individuality, this new spectre being denominated
a status of homestead. Hence, without conscious awareness the emphasis
shifts from a personal right which may be asserted against the clutching
claws of creditors to a "thingified" concept which seems to take on an
independent existence. Hence, deluded by the reality of this creature,
52
one easily becomes mystified by its changing personality.
It is believed that realism and clarity of analysis would result if these
145. 1d. at 300.
146. Id. at 299.
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problems involving the descent of homesteads were approached in itis
manner-could the decedent have claimed this particular realty exempt
from the forced sale of his creditors? If hc could, then the land is
homestead and shoutld descend accordingly. If he could not, theni it is
not homestead and its devolution should be the same as other property.
Of course, this approach will not lessen the problem. It will still hc
necessary to determine what requirements must have existed in order for
him to have been able to have an exemption. Thus, it will still be
necessary to determine that this land constituted his home, that lie with
one or more persons lived there as a family, and that he in fact was head
of the family. These and other factual tests of what constitute a
homestead will still be needed. The advantage of the suggested approach
will be a keener analysis and more intelligent understanding. Thus,
being aware of the real nature of the homestead, there will be less
probability that the conceptualistic creature will confuse and bewilder
the analyst, less likelihood that it will take on a reality and existence
to which it is not entitled.
Applying this approach to the above cases, it is clear that the thirty-five
acre tract in the Wilson 5' case was a part of the homestead as the
decedent undoubtedly could have claimed it exempt from his creditors'
execution. The result in the Passmore54 case can likewise be explained.
According to the decision, Mrs. Passmore never became the head of a
family while she owned the land since she lived alone, apparently
recognized no obligation to support the wayward son, and received no
familial love or respect from him. Hence, the land was not subject to
the statute prescribing the descent of homesteads. A fortiori. she could
not have claimed this land exempt from her creditors as the tests for a
homestead in both instances are the same. If it should be decided that
a decedent could have claimed an exemption, then the problem of descent
would also be decided. If the land is homestead in one instance, then
it is homestead in the other.
Other cases concerned with this problem included Hussa v. Hussa!5
in which case it was concluded that certain land owned by decedent in
Florida was not a homestead.

It was his practice to spend only the

winters in Florida. For many years prior to his death his wife was a
bona fide resident of New York and never even lived in the same house
with him during her visits. The son likewise never lived in Florida.
In Brady v. Brady ' " it was concluded that a married son who lived with
his father and actively managed the citrus grove was the head of the
family. The father was not the family head since lie had become a
15,.
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member of his son's family, and, therefore, the father's land was not
subject to the homestead provisions. The question of whether the homestead
was abandoned was the focal point in Beck v. Wylie' 1"7 when it was
established that a frequently married daughter had left the home prior
to her mother's death. The case was remanded to determine the issue
5 8 illustrates
of abandonment. Jones v. Neibergall"'
that an heir to the
homestead may be estopped to assert the homestead character of the
property. In this case a daughter participated in the distribution and
settlement of her mother's estate in accordance with provisions of the
will. After her brother had spent large sums on the land allotted him,
she asserted the homestead character of the land and attempted to take
one-third of it. Naturally, she was estopped unless she should make
full restitution which she apparently could not do.
Homestead tax exemption: Legislation.-The giving of false information
in regard to homestead real property tax exemption is made a misdemeanor
by Chapter 28105 of the Laws of 1953. This act amended Florida Statutes
Section 192.16 by adding Section three which provides that the person
giving such false information may be punished by a fine of not more
than $500 or by six months imprisonment in the county jail or both.
Perhaps the most significant development in this area was the invalidation
in SParkman v. State'5" of the 1951 statute 1 0 requiring a year's residence
in Florida in order to qualify for the homestead tax exemption. Since
the constitutional provision"' only requires that the owner of the realty
own and occupy it as his principal residence on January 1 of the year
in question, the statute requiring additional residence was unconstitutional.
In another interesting tax case it was held in Overstreet v. Turbi 16' 2
that a multiple dwelling unit, owned by different families and each making
it their homestead, was but a single unit and entitled to only one $5000.00
exemption.
Future interests: Legislation.-The most significant development in
the field of Future Interests was the enactment of Florida Statutes
Section 689.18 in 1951163 limiting the effectiveness of reverter and
forfeiture provisions in private conveyances to a duration of twenty-one
years. The terms reverter and forfeiture provisions obviously mean
possibilities of reverter and rights of re-entry for condition broken. The
statute is specifically made retroactive as well as prospective in its application
so that such provisions already in existence as well as subsequently created
ones are affected by the statute. The statute also provides for the enforcement
157.
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of these restrictions by a bill in equity. The act is aimed specifically at
reverter rights created as an incident to the imposition of use restrictions
in conveyances between individuals. Specifically exempted from the
operation of the statute are similar interests retained by the grantor as a
result of conveyances to "any governmental, educational, literary, scientific,
religious, public utility, public transportation or non-profit corporation
or association." 1 4 The constitutionality of the statute has not been
adjudicated. 016
Two cases during this period involved application of the Rule against
Perpetuities. Florida follows the common law rule. In Adams v. Vidal0 6
it was asserted that although Florida followed the early common law rule
that "die without issue" presumptively means an indefinite failure of issue,
a contrary construction will be given if such an intent is expressed. Hence,
a trust for designated individuals until a particular one became twenty-one
with gift over in case each or all died leaving no widow, children, or
descendants of children, was construed as meaning a definite failure of
issue so that the estate must necessarily vest within lives in being. 6 7
Hence, the Rule against Perpetuities was not violated. In Cartinhour v.
l-Iouser,168 the court approved the nile favoring a construction vesting
estates at the earliest possible moment. Thus, it was held that a devise
in trust for a sister for life, with gift over of the income to a niece and
nephew for not less than ten years before final disposition, was held valid.
The estate vested in the beneficiaries at the death of the testatrix but
the possession was postponed at the discretion of the trustee. Both
decisions are sound.
IV, MoRTc.AGES AND LIENS

Mortgages: Legislation.-A statutory procedure for the foreclosure
of mortgages was enacted by Chapter 28093 of the Laws of 1953 amending
Florida Statutes Section 702.02. The old statute simply provided that in
a foreclosure action the original or a copy of the mortgage shall be
attached to the complaint and made a part thereof. The new act requires
that and also the attachment of the note. Instruments thus attached to
the bill constitute averment of their contents to the same effect as if
fully set forth in the body of the complaint. Section two " " provides that
the clerk, rather than a special master, may sell the land at public sale after
the final foreclosure decree, such sale to take place not less than ten nor more
than thirty days after the decree. Terms and conditions of the sale shall be
164. Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26927, § 5.
165. The constitutional aspects are discussed in Stephenson, Constitutional Inviolability of Possibilitiesof Reverter and Rights of Entry in Florida, 6 MI.uin L.Q. 162 (1952).
166. 60 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1952).
167. Ibid.
168. 66 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1953).
169. FIa. Laws 1953, c. 28093, § 2.
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published once only, at least seven days prior to the sale. Section three 7 0
provides that the clerk shall make out a certificate of sale in accordance with
the statutory form provided. If no objections are made for a period of ten
days the clerk shall prepare a certificate of title in accordance with the
statutory form provided. Upon filing of this certificate the sale is confirmed
and title passes fully and completely to the purchaser named in the
certificate. Section four"' contains provisions for the disbursement of
proceeds from the sale and asserts that any objections to proposed
disbursements shall have no effect of clouding the title to the property.
Section five 12 asserts that the value of the property shall be conclusively
presumed to be the amount bid at the sale and unless objection is filed
within ten days the value fixed shall have the same effect as though the
court had decreed the value, No such objection shall operate as a
cloud on the title. The enactment of such a statutory scheme is desirable
in the interests of certainty and security even though there may be some
dissatisfaction in particular provisions.
In a number of decisions involving mortgages it was held: that a
bolder of a note electing to exercise his option to declare all remaining
payments due and payable must notify tile mortgagor of his election
in some effective manner before tender of payment; 7 3 that denial of a
motion to set aside a foreclosure decree based on her attorney's lack of
authority to enter into certain stipulations was res judicata in a subsequent
chancery suit to vacate the decree;'
that parol evidence under the
circumstances of a particular case should not be admitted to show a
contemporaneous parol agreement as to interest; 75 that a purchase money
mortgagee vendor in possession for more than twenty years as a quit
claim grantee from the niortgagors could maintain a quiet title action
since she was in possession as owner and not as mortgagec;"7 and that
under the facts of the particular case' the mortgagee had violated the
civil usury statutes and so should forfeit double the interest reserved. In
1 7l 8
lighland's Home Builders v. Marine Bank and Trust Company
a vendor
was not allowed to defeat a mortgagee's rights by terminating an option
contract because the purchase price was tendered a day or two too late.
In this case the value of improvements financed by the mortgagee greatly
exceeded the contract price of the land. A decree issued foreclosing the
mortgage and giving the vendor a prior lien to the extent of the purchase
price. Apparently, because of unconscionable consequences otherwise
170. Id. at § 3.
171. Id. at § 4.
172. Id.
at § 5.
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rcsulting, the option contract became an enforceable sale and purchase
agreement.
Mechanics' liens: 79 Legislation.-Subsection eleven of Section 84.0

of the Mechanics' Lien Law of Florida was amended by Chapter 28243 of
the Laws of 1953. This section relates to payments of owners to contractors.
The amendment provides that in the case of a contract of $3,000.00 or
over, the owner may require the contractor to furnish bond in an amount
of at least twice the contract price conditioned on payment of labor,
subcontractors, and materialmen. The new provisions also provide for
methods of payment for labor, niaterialmen and subcontractors in the event

of failure of the contractor to give bond, failure of completion of the
job, and failure of the owner to make payments.
Considerable litigation over mechanics' liens reached the Supreme
Court during the past two years in the disposition of which it was held
that: flying crop dusters are entitled to a lien for services performed;1 30
that persons who stake out the land into building lots, clear and burn
the brush, cut out and lay roads, and perform other work in developing
the land are entitled to a lien;' 8 that a mechanics' lien nay not bc
asserted against realty held by a municipality in trust for the perpetual
benefit of the public as a museum of hobbies) 8 2' that a mechanics' lien
is superior to a federal tax lien; 8 3 that a contractor is entitled to a lien
even though he did not obtain a municipal license to engage in business;I,that a contractor was not precluded from establishing an equitable lien
simply because he had a remedy under the mechanics' lien law;'8 that
it was not error to deny a motion to set aside a lien on the basis of

non-compliance with the corporation tax law when this non-compliance
was not raised in the trial of the cause on the merits and compliance
was proved at the hearing on the motion; 8 0 and that a judgment in
favor of a lien will be affirmed where there is sufficient evidence to
support it)8 7
In Foley Lumber Company v. Koester8 8 the court pointed out the

different procedures applicable to the assertion of a lien where a claimant
is dealing directly with the owner and where he is dealing with a general
contractor employed by the owner. If a subcontractor is dealing with
a general contractor he must serve a cautionary notice on the owner to
179.
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perfect his lien, otherwise the owner may continue to make payment
to the general contractor; if payment is properly made, it is then too
late for a subcontractor to claim a lien. Also, liens of the subcontractor
are effective only as to the unpaid balance and to any payments not
properly made. On the other hand, if the subcontractor deals directly
with the owner lie need not file a cautionary notice as the owner is
primarily liable and the materialman has a lien for the full value of
the work done, and may enforce it at any time within twelve months
after the completion of the work.18 9
Two cases' 90 involved the question of the propriety of the final payment
to the general contractor and the ability of subcontratcors to claim liens
without serving the cautionary notice on the owner of the realty. Both
of these cases held that the final payment to the general contractor
without obtaining from him an affidavit that all potential lienors were
paid was not a proper payment under the Mechanics' Lien Law. The
court therefore concluded that such unpaid subcontractors could perfect
liens against the owner even without having previously served a cautionary
notice on him, but that such liens would be limited to the total amount
of the final payment.'9
The court expressly overruled10 2 the earlier
case of Southern Paint Manufacturing Company v. Crump'9 3 insofar as
it held that such final payment in good faith without the affidavit was a
payment properly made.
In Bensam Corporation v. Fenton' 4 the supplier to a subcontractor
was granted a lien after the court found that the general contractor had
made an independent contract with the supplier to pay him and not
just a guaranty contract unenforceable because not in writing. Hence,
when the owner paid the final payment after receiving a cautionary notice,
the final payment was not properly made and the materialman had his lien.
In Landrum v. Marion Builders'9 5 the contractor abandoned the work and
the owner, after supervising its completion, brought an action to determine
the rights of the two parties and several subcontractors. It was held that
two payments made to the general contractor prior to the time they
were due and payable under the terms of the contract were proper, and
allowance of credit for them should be made to the owner, that waiver
of liens conditioned on obtaining a loan would be avoided and the
liens revived when the loan failed to materialize, and that a materialman
189. Ibid.
190. Shaw v. Del-Mar Cabinet Co., 63 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1953); Curtis v. McCardel,
63 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1953).
191. Ibid.
192. Shaw v. Del-Mar Cabinet Co., 63 So.;d 264, 268 (Fla. 1953).
193. 132 Fla. 799, 182 So. 291 (1938).
194. 63 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1953).
195. 53 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1951).
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was entitled to a lien for the entire amount when the materials were
delivered on the credit of the owner and not that of the general contractor.'10
A mechanics' lien must be based on a contract either express or
implied. It was accordingly held in Lee v. Sas1 9 7 that a vendor purchase
money mortgagee reacquired the land free from the claims of an overseer
who had made a contract with the purchaser while he was in possession.
Lienors must assert separate liens against each lot in a group building
project and cannot file a single claim covering several lots and buildings.9 8
A mechanics' lien when perfected relates back to the visible commencement
of the work and will take precedence over a mortgage executed subsequent
to the beginning of the work but prior to filing the claim for lien. 99
In order for one claimant to get priority over others he must file a
cautionary notice in accordance with statutory provisions before the
commencement of the work or before the completion of the work and
within thirty days from its beginning. A notice served more than thirty
days after the beginning of the work but while it is still going on is not
sufficient under the statute.200 It was held in Branch v. McGlynn 20 ' that
a contractor could perfect his lien against property held by the entireties

although he dealt only with the husband and did not file his claim within
90 days and did not serve a cautionary notice on the wife. The court
considered the argument that the husband was the statutory agent of the
wife 20 2 but found in favor of the lienor simply on grounds of the Mechanics'

Lien Law, Apparently each tenant by the entireties is seized of the whole
for lien purposes as a result of liberally construing the Mechanics'
Lien Law.
V.

SPECIAL

TIThES

Tax titles.-A few cases involving tax deeds occupied the attention3
of the court during this period. Halseth v. Cleveland Trust Company
allowed the former owner to have the tax deed cancelled when it appeared
that the deed had been issued because of a mistake, general laxness,
and confusion of the taxing officials. The owner had made a bona fide
effort to pay the taxes and had been diligent but failed only because of
the taxing officers. Hence, on reimbursement of the tax deed grantee,
the owner recovered his land.

In another suit 20 4 it was held that a belated

attempt to redeem tax certificates was ineffective because the title to
the land had previously vested in the trustees of the Internal Improvement
196. Ibid.
197. 53 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1951).
198. Steel Supply Corp. v. Carpenter, 66 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1953); Maule Industries
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924
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Fund.20 5 The clerk's participation in the tardy attempt to redeem by
accepting the money and nmarking the certificate redeemed was without
effect.
Aldred v. Rornano 200 involved a contest between two parties who
were attempting to purchase outstanding tax certificates and obtain a
deed. Romano had deposited a sum of money with the county clerk
to redeem all outstanding certificates, then actually purchased outstanding
city tax certificates and filed a foreclosure suit. After the suit was filed
Romano learned that Aldred had redeemed state and county certicates
and had them assigned to him. For some reason the land in dispute
was not incorporated in Romano's bill to foreclose the certificates and was
not in the is pendens or final decree. While this foreclosure suit was
in progress Aldred acquired a quit claim deed from the former owner.
Under these circumstances it was held that Aldred became the owner of
this particular land. He acquired title by virtue of the quit claim deed;
such tax certificates as he then held merged with the legal title, and such
as he did not have, he could have, as owner, redeemed within the period
fixed by law. The Master's deed in the foreclosure suit to Romano conveyed
no title because there was no basis in the suit for such transfer.
A former vendee was successful in asserting a title based on tax deeds
as against the adverse contention of a merger title effective only to
constitute payment of taxes. 2 7 The plaintiff was an assignee of a land
contract who in turn assigned her rights. After the hurricane in 1926
her assignee abandoned the contract and the plaintiff again went into
possession after purchasing a tax deed in 1932. The defendant derived
his title through the former owner by a deed in 1938 but he did not
assert his claim until 1949. Under these facts title was quieted in the
plaintiff, the court holding that the original contract was abandoned and
had been terminated by its own terms when plaintiff entered under the
tax deed in 1932. Hence, she could assert her tax title. Her possession
charged the defendant with knowledge of her title when he purchased;
any fraud practiced on the former owner was personal to him, and
furthermore, defendant was barred both by the four year statute of
limitations applicable to tax deeds 2B and the twenty year general statute
of limitations 20 9 as well as laches.
Adverse possession.-The doctrine of adverse possession was subjected
to judicial scrutiny in a number of situations during this period. The old
205. This resulted from the operation of Fla. Laws 1931, c. 14717.
206. 58 So.2d 436 (Fla. 1952).
207. Putzer v. Homeridge Properties, 57 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1952).
208. FLA. STAT. § 196.06 (1943). In Deas v. Turner, 56 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1952)
the statute was applied in favor of a tax deed grantee.
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rule that a deed to land given by the purported title holder covering land
which is in the adverse possession of another is void as against such adverse
claimant was reaffirmedY 10 The deed, however, is void only as against
the adverse claimant and is perfectly valid between the parties. This rule
prevents the grantee of such a deed from bringing an ejectment action
in his own name against the adverse possessor. The proper remedy in
such a case is for the grantor to bring the suit in the name of the
grantee. The justification for the continuance of such feudalistic
technicalities might well be questioned. Since the grantee is the one most
vitally interested in recovering the land, and since causes of actions are
generally assignable, it seems quite incongruous that he should be unable
to sue in his own name. Any recovery will inure to the grantee. It would
seem that the real-party-in-interest statute2 1 ' should have obviated the
necessity of continuing this technical circuity.
Quite in accord with established authority it was reaffirmed that the
possession of a cotenaut was not adverse to the rights of the other
tenants, that the payment of taxes by such cotenant in possession was
likewise not the assertion of a sufficient adverse claim, and that a quitclaim
deed conveying the interest of a cotenant does not constitute color of
title to the whole estate.2 12 The principle was reaffirmed that in an
ejectment action the better title determines the right to possession, and
auxiliary thereto, it was held that where plaintiff's deed was faulty by
not referring to the plat book and page number his title was not so
defective as to deprive him of the right of testing his title against a
21
defendant relying on adverse possession without color of title. a Of
course, in these cases as in others, it is error to set aside a verdict of the
214
jury where there is sufficient evidence to support it.
The doctrine of adverse possession in relation to disputed boundaries
continues to assume significant proportions in this type of litigation. Thus,
a claimant to a disputed strip of land may prevail on the basis of adverse
possession. To do this in Florida, however, he must intend to claim up
to the boundary as his own, regardless of whether it's the true boundary
or not, otherwise his holding will not be adverse. 5 Likewise, he must
conform to the other statutory requirements such as the payment of
taxes if such is the case. 2"
Normally, a vendor's possession after a
210. Alford v. Sinclair, 55 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1951); May v. H-olley, 59 So.2d 636
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conveyance is not adverse to that of the vendee. Tt' Although ejectment
usually should be used to determine the title and right to possession
of realty, if the plaintiff's exact remedy is unknown because of lack of
knowledge as to when the defendant's possession became adverse, or if
he was occupying under a purported agreement of boundary acquiescence,
then he may resort to declaratory judgment procedure. 1 8 A private right
of easement in lands to which the offer of dedication has been revoked
can be barred by adverse possession. Compliance with the statutes il
effect while title is being perfected is necessary for the acquisition of an
adverse title.
The filing of a suit tolls the statute of limitations and a subsequent
transfer of the case from the equity to the law side of the court does
not affect this prineiple.' 9 Such a transfer is simply a continuation of
the original suit so that if the statute hadn't run at that time, it would
not now be a defense to the action. Closely allied to the doctrine of adverse
possession in relation to boundary disputes is the rule of acquiesence.
Under the theory that title was established by acquiesence in a boundary
line, that line determines the extent of ownership of the parties on
the theory that such a line is the true line. Clearly, adverse possession
is not aplicable and the court correctly so held in Euse v. Gibbs.22" However
in Shaw v. Williars221 the court apparently confused the two doctrines
because it discussed at length acquiesence in the line for the prescriptive
period. If acquiesence in a line established after a dispute determines
for the period
the true boundary, there should be no need to acquiesce 222
of the statute of limitations or for any other definite period.
Writ of assistance.-The statutory remedy of writ of assistance to
obtain possession was denied in Drowdy v. Warfield.2 3 It is interesting
to note that this case was twice considered by the Supreme Court without
the merits of the controversy ever being settled. The basis for the decision
in the instant case was simply that the statute provides that the writ is
an auxiliary remedy available for the enforcement of a decree when the
othei party refuses to comply. Since there had been no previous decree
for the delivery of possession, there was nothing on which to base
the writ.
Dedication: Legislation.-New legislation in the field of dedication
consisted of the enactment of Chapter 28206 of the Laws of 1953,
217. Ibid. See note 98 supra. Stark v. Frayer, 67 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1953) discussing
the availability of quiet title actions.
67 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1953) discussing the availability of quiet title actions.
218. Meernan v. Roberson, 60 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1952).
219. Deas v. Burnham, 65 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1953).
220. 49 So.2d 843 (Fla. 1951).
221. 50 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1950).
222. This is apparently the view of the Florida cases. Euse v. Gibbs, 49 So.2d 843
(Fla. 1951); 'Watrous v. Morrison, 33 Fla. 261, 14 So. 805 (1894). See note 108
supra, a line of authority does require acquiescence for the statutory period.
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authorizing the abandonment of county parks. The authorization does
not extend to state or federal parks. Anyone owning land abutting
the park grounds may petition for the abandonment. Procedure to be
followed is the same as provided in Florida Statutes Sections 343.36
to 343.40,224 regulating the manner of discontinuing county roads. All
landowners in the subdivision in which the park is located shall be notified
by mail twenty-eight days before a hearing. The park shall not be closed
if objection is raised by twenty percent of the landowners, by owners of
twenty percent of the land, by anyone owning a lot within 400 feet of
the park, or by anyone owning a lot in the plat on which there is a
building?. 25
Cases involving dedication during the past two years indicate no
fundamental changes in the basic requirements for a valid dedication.
There must be an offer and an acceptance and the court will require
proof of both before there will be a complete dedication. Filing the plat,
delineating streets and parks constitutes but an offer to dedicate which
must be accepted either formally by resolution on behalf of the appropriate
governing agency or by sufficient public use. In applying these basic
concepts to particular fact situations it was held in one case12 that
public acceptance by opening up and using the main thoroughfare in a
platted subdivision constituted an acceptance of the offer to dedicate all
the streets in the subdivision. This was the first Florida case to directly
so hold although elsewhere there is considerable authority.2 27 It may
evidence a more liberal attitude by the Florida Supreme Court toward
finding a completed dedication, but in subsequent decisions so far the
court has not reaffirmed the proposition. In Board of Commissioners v.
2 8 the court explicitly considered the effect of
Sebring Realty Company=
Florida Statutes Section 177.10, requiring the appropriate governing body
to approve the plat before its filing, and concluded that the provision
did not dispense with the necessity of a subsequent acceptance. Such
an approval of the plat is simply a prerequisite to recording and does
not take the place of or act as an acceptance of the offer to dedicate.
Private easements in dedicated lands.-Thc mere fact of the existence
of a plat does not show a clear offer to dedicate, and in the absence
of a valid completed dedication, the city cainot enforce the removal of
obstructions. 229 Likewise, the city under such circumstances cannot enforce
private rights deriving from the sale of lots according to a plat where
there was no acceptance of the offer to dedicate. That private parties
may obtain easements and possibly other rights in land offered fox
STAT. §§ 343.36-343A0 (1943).
225. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28206.
226. Indian Rocks Beach South Shore v. Ewell, 59 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1952).
227. 16 Am. fur. 387 (1938).
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dedication is clearly established. 'Thus, in McCorquodal v. Keyton2 30 the
grantor sold lots in reference to a plat which indicated a parcel of land
dedicated as a park to be used and enjoyed by the lot owners. Later,
the grantor erected a refreshment stand in the park and subsequently sold
the concession. The court upheld an injunction prohibiting the sale of
any park land for the exclusive use of anyone. The owner of the fee of
the park is barred from depriving his grantees of rights which he led them
to believe they had. The purchasers acquired by implied covenant a
private easement in the park, and use of the concession stand was an
invasion of their rights.
That this private right of easement may be acquired even though
there was no public acceptance of the offer to dedicate is illustrated in the
case of Powers v. Scobie.331 In this case, although there was apparently
a partial acceptance of the offer to dedicate the street, the court found
no acceptance of the offer to dedicate that portion of the street under
litigation. Although there was considerable evidence of a public user, the
court thought that it was not unequivocally shown that user was of the
street as dedicated. Such a strict requirement of proof of acceptance here
seems hardly in spirit with the earlier decision holding acceptance of the
main road constituted acceptance of all of the proposed streets in the
subdivision. The court did, however, in the instant case find a private right
of easement over the street as delineated. In determining the extent
of such an easement, it was asserted that the "broad or unity" 232 rule
will be applied in relation to parks but that in relation to streets such a
It therefore adopted the "beneficial" or
rule would be impracticable.
"complete enjoyment ' 2 33 rule which limits the grantee's private right of
easement to streets and alleys shown on the plat to those as are reasonably
and materially beneficial to the grantee and of which the deprivation
would reduce the value of his lot. It accordingly held that the plaintiff
would be protected by having the street redelineated and that the
defendant would not be compelled to remove his house. 23 4 Tiese general
principles were reaffirmed in Brooks-GarrisonHotel Corp. v. Sara Investment
ComPany.a3' Mumaw v. Robertson2 '01 is likewise in accord with these
general principles and in addition illustrates that a private right of easement
may be lost by adverse possession and estoppel.
230. 63 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1953).
231. 60 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1952).
232. The rule is that a grantee to whom a conveyance is made by reference to a
map or plat acquires a private right, frequently designated as an easement, to the use of
all the streets and alleys delineated on such map or plat.
233. This rule limits the grantee's private right of user in streets and alleys shown
on a map or plat by reference to which his conveyance was made to such streets and
alleys as are reasonably or materially beneficial to the grantee and of which the deprivation
would reduce the value of his lot. 7 A.L.R.2d 633 (1949).
234. Powers v. Scobie, 60 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1952).
235, 61 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1952).
236, 60 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1952).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Eminent domain and police power: Legislation.-The statutes providing
for proceedings supplemental to condemnation were amended by Chapter
26921 of the Laws of 1951. Salient features of the amendment include:
shifting the provision for eminent domain by housing authorities from
Section 74.01 of the statutes to Section 74.15; changing Section 74.03 to
permit the parties to be heard on questions of jurisdiction and on the
sufficiency of the pleadings; making the appointment of appraisers mandatory
instead of permissive; and changing Section 74.09 by removing the
disability of appraisers to testify as witnesses when the suit is submitted
to a jury to fix an award. Chapter 28282 of the Laws of 1953 amended
Section 73.04 of the statutes relating to process in eninent domain
proceedings by requiring the clerk to include in the notice the legal
description of the real estate involved.
In a number of decisions involving the permissible limits of the
exercise of eminent domain and the police power it was held that: (1)
blighted areas could not be condemned for redevelopment when the
area was to be used by private enterprise for light industry and commerce
and not for low cost housing;23T (2) that a municipality can establish
reasonable set-back lines under the police power and need not resort to
eminent domain; 238 (3) that the summary method of obtaining possession
provided for in Florida Statutes Section 74.01 et seq. pending the completion
of eminent domain proceedings is constitutional because it provides for
more than ample protection to the property owner;2 30 and (4) that a carta
blank extension by the legislature of private restrictive covenants was
invalid as an unreasonable exercise of the police power and an impairment
2 10
of the obligation of contracts.
Other cases involving eminent domain proceedings held: that a
landowner was entitled tinder the statute to reasonable attorney fees in a
condemnation proceeding even though the county subsequently abandoned
the proceedings; 2 4' that the condemnation of a fee simple title and the
award of damages therefore precluded a subsequent suit for use and
occupancy by the city prior to the condemnation because of the principle
of res judicata; 2 2 that eminent domain proceedings are authorized for
the acquisition of land to be used in the future and that the condemning
body need not have on hand money, plans, and specifications for immediate
construction; 243 that the court need not grant a severance in the condemnation proceedings simply because the title to a portion of the land
is in dispute, but that an award may be made and then held for
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
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distribution until the title is settled and proper apportionment made;2t 4
that the jurisdiction of the trial court must be raised in that court; 24 'I
and that a trial court's verdict will be sustained where there is evidence
? -6
to support it.2
VI. Rmm-s iN LAND
Easements: Legislation.-Chapter 28070, Laws of 1953, amended the
provisions for a statutory easement 247 of ingress and egress to land blocked
areas. The amendment was probably occasioned by the decision in
4 8 The exact effect of the
South Dade Farms, inc., v. B. & L. Farms.2
decision was a little obscure owing to the fact that the rationale of the
opinion suggested the whole statute void as a taking of property from
one private owner for the use of another, but the exact holding cautiously
restricted the decision to a declaration that the application of the statute
to the facts at bar would be contrary to the federal and state constitutions.
In this case there were common law casements and a dedicated roadway
available to the shut-off area, but such ways were impassable. Under such
facts it would seem that the land was not really completely shut-off and
that there would thus be no need for the assertion of a statutory
easement.
It is well settled that a dominant easement holder may keep his
way in repair and that the servient owner has no duty to keep it in repair
for him. 2 "' As to lands publicly dedicated, the interested party should
get the proper public officials to maintain it in a usable condition. It is
thus possible that the above case only held that the application of a
statutory easement to these facts would be unconstitutional.
The validity of the statute was raised but not decided in an earlier
case the same year. In that case, Guess v. Agar,250 the defendant was
asserting an easement for the purposes of hauling shell. The court correctly
denied the application of the statutory easement because the use being
made of the way was not included within those specified in the statute.
Likewise, the court found against an easement of necessity since there
was no unity of title from some source other than the state. The court
asserted that there is no basis for implying a grant in a conveyance by
the state. The new statute2- 1 codifies the decision of Guess v. Agar,
supra, as to the requirements for the common law implied easement of
necessity, and endeavors to avoid the constitutional objections raised in
South Dade Farms, supra, by providing a method of compensation to the
owner of the land over which the easement is asserted.
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Restrictive covenants.-In line with the more or less general attitude
towards restrictive covenants, the Florida Supreme Court, while adhering
to a policy of favoring the free and untranmeled use of real property,
reaffirmed its position of enforcing such restrictive covenants, though strictly
z2
construing them, if the intention is clear and the restrictions reasonable.
The reasonableness of such restrictions may be litigated either in toto
or in regard to a particular building or application. A covenant restricting
the use of land to single family residences was construed as prohibiting
a church, 2 ' and the fact that the covenant would expire in two years
was held not a sufficient basis for changing the terms of the covenant.
An earlier case 254 with similar covenants which permitted the operation
of a private school in a building which had been constructed as a private
residence was distinguished. In that case the covenant was only against
construction of such buildings whereas these covenants were against both
construction and use, and the church was not yet constructed. In another
case, 255 the court enforced a covenant to always use the land as a
sidewalk or highway, the purpose apparently being to use this corner lot
as a mode of ingress and egress to the adjoining gas station.
Miscellaneous.-Among a number of cases not particularly significant
it was held that an owner of an airport could not enjoin an adjoining
drive-in theater as such an enterprise would not so unreasonably interfere
with the airport owner's enjoyment of the surface as to constitute a
nuisance, and that the owner of the land can certainly make reasonable
use of the space above his premises. 258 This was not a spite structure.
It was also held that a garbage disposal plant in the same location for
twenty-eight years, although enlarged several times, did not constitute a
nuisance. 257 Mandamus was said not to lie to compel city officials to
record a plat, and an ordinance providing for minimum street and sidewalk

requirements in platted areas was reasonable and did not deprive the
owners of their property without compensation.Y"8 The owners could still
sell their property without reference to any plat. A defunct municipal
corporation was held to have no power to convey real estate according
to Anglin v. Lauderdale-bythe-Sea.20 The intentional interference with
A bigamist was
the flow of subterranean waters was held actionable. 0
denied the right to inherit from his wife after twenty years of desertion
on the doctrine of estoppel.261
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